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The Existential Psychoanalytic Institute & Society is a contemporary and forward-thinking psychoanalytic institute offering educational programs, book publishing and research education programs, publishing books and advancing research in the history and application of psychoanalysis in clinical and theoretical settings. Most importantly, we seek to chart a course for understanding human subjectivity using the tools of psychoanalysis to reduce human suffering and its consequences. As such, a good portion of our research involves conflict resolution, mediation, and practical applications of non-violence in science, law and social policy. In addition, our work touches on fields like conflict resolution. Through rigorous research we examine the historical past of psychoanalytic thought using critical theory, phenomenology and other disciplines, for example helpful branches of mathematics including game theory, set theory, category theory, and all logics as a foundation for projects. 

Through our educational programs, publications, research, professional networking opportunities and EPIS radio show broadcasts, we facilitate these goals in collaboration with our members, faculty, students, colleagues and communities. 

Our Work and Educational Programs 

Our work is continually evolving, but currently comprises educational programs, quarterly meetings, professional networking opportunities, the EPIS Press publishing house, our weekly EPIS Radio Show, and academic conferences.

What Makes Us Different?

Our work has real world applications in education, science, law and conflict resolution, social policy, clinical psychology, and community programs. Therapists and counselors associated with EPIS have strong private practices in psychology, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis and professional mediation in individual and organization contexts. Academics associated with EPIS are professors in philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychology, history and related fields.  

Our publishing house, EPIS Press, was founded in 2004, with a mission to offer a publishing experience different from larger presses such as Karnac, Tavistock and Routledge. We publish manuscripts in phenomenology, psychoanalysis and critical theory and have published works in theory and literature focusing on the human condition and how humans interface with their environmental and social contexts. EPIS Press has also published titles from the professionals and academics at the BCS Dispute Resolution Research Institute in mediation/negotiation, psychoanalysis, and game theory. In 2012, we began publishing the academic journal Presencing EPIS. Upcoming projects include the relationship of psychoanalysis to global warming and ecosystem protection. 

Our educational programs are unique, progressive and rigorous. We don’t seek accreditation by an outside, bureaucratic accrediting body that would limit the scope of our programs and the opportunities we offer students. Many of our programs offer publication possibilities through EPIS Press and EPIS Journal. All our graduates are entitled to become part of the research or teaching faculty. 

The location is virtual, allowing access for an international, diverse student body who may be pursuing a range of professional, research and creative practices that broaden and deepen their contributions to the learning experience. 

Our curriculum is not limited to phenomenology, classical psychoanalysis, or existential psychotherapy/analysis. We also teach French deconstruction, critical theory, semiology, cultural criticism, and all related scientific disciplines, including neuro-psychoanalysis. 

Our September 2023 curriculum offers rich opportunities for students who are beginning study, seeking professional development, or arriving at study from diverse professional and educational backgrounds. Jump to our curriculum page to learn more or contact Dr. Kevin Boileau, PhD, Dean of Faculty, for more information, at kbradref@gmail.com.

EPIS Seminars 2023-2024

Existential Psychoanalytic
Institute & Society

2023-2024
Seminar
Curriculum

1st DRAFT

*There may be small modifications in the reading depending upon
the needs of the EPIS community.

*Default is Mountain Time. Please adjust your
calendar depending upon your time zone.

Session 1:
September 1 & September 2 (2023)

FRIDAY:

Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis

(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Renaud Barbaras
Introduction to a Phenomenology of Life, Indiana University Press, 2021.
Introduction, pp. 1 – 18;
Part 1, The Divisions of Life, pp. 19 – 128

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology

(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Dan Zahavi
Self & Other, Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame, Oxford, 2014.
Part I, The Experiential Self, pp. 3 – 94

SATURDAY

Psychoanalysis, Critical Theory & Philosophy:

(Saturday, 10 a.m.-Noon)
Mattias Desmet
The Psychology of Totalitarianism, Chelsea Green, 2022
Part 1, pp. 11-88.

Applied Phenomenology:

(Saturday, Noon – 2 p.m.)
Bryan E. Bannon, ed.
Nature and Experience: Phenomenology and the Environment, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Part 1, Chapter 1, pp. 3-16.

Session 2:
December 1 & December 2 (2023)

FRIDAY

Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis

(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Renaud Barbaras
Introduction to a Phenomenology of Life,
Part 2, Life and Exteriority, pp. 129-240.

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology

(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Dan Zahavi
Self & Other, Part II, Empathic Understanding, pp. 95-196.

SATURDAY

Psychoanalysis, Critical Theory & Philosophy:

(Saturday, 10 a.m.-Noon)
Mattias Desmet
The Psychology of Totalitarianism, Part II, pp.89- 146.

Applied Phenomenology

(Saturday, Noon – 2 p.m.)
Bryan E. Bannon, ed.
Nature and Experience: Phenomenology and the Environment, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Part 1, Chapters 2 & 3, pp. 17-42.

Session 3:
March 1 & 2 (2024)

FRIDAY

Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis

(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Renaud Barbaras
Introduction to a Phenomenology of Life
Part 3, pp. 241-322.

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology

(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Dan Zahavi,
Self & Other
Part III, pp.197-250

SATURDAY

Psychoanalysis, Critical Theory & Philosophy:

(Saturday, 10 a.m.-Noon)
Hannah Arendt
Responsibility and Judgment
Introduction vii, Prologue 3,
Chapter 1, Responsibility, pp. 17 – 146.

Critical Theory/Applied Phenomenology

(Saturday, Noon – 2 p.m.)
Bryan E. Bannon, ed.
Nature and Experience: Phenomenology and the Environment, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Part 1, Chapter 4, pp. 43-52.


Session 4
June 7 and June 8 (2024)

FRIDAY

Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis

(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Renaud Barbaras
Introduction to a Phenomenology of Life,
Part 3, pp. 323-356.

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology

(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Dan Zahavi
Self & Other
Part III, pp.197-250, continue study

SATURDAY

Psychoanalysis, Critical Theory & Philosophy:

(Saturday, 10 a.m.- Noon)
Hannah Arendt
Responsibility and Judgment, Schocken Reprint, 2005
Chapter 1, Responsibility, pp. 147-192.

Applied Phenomenology

(Saturday, Noon – 2 p.m.)
Bryan E. Bannon, ed.
Nature and Experience: Phenomenology and the Environment, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Part 1, Chapter 5, pp. 53-68 and Part II, Chapter 6, pp. 69-80.

February 15, 2023 version
EPIS curriculum, copyright, 2023-24
Official Version, Draft 1
EPIS Education
Copyright EPIS Education 2023-24

An understanding of power requires that we initially consider the dialectic between structuralism, which holds in various ways that power emanates within structure; and voluntarism, which holds that individuals hold and exercise power. We should consider that both positions are correct but incomplete; that human agency exists within structure. This is why it is so important to understand structural factors such as ideology, language, values, the distribution of wealth, and other cultural beliefs. It is equally important to explore the degree to which individuals have some conscious autonomy to affect change. This raises questions about the nature of freedom, subjectivity, critical thinking, deception, and how beliefs are shaped through ideology.

We can ask questions about the nature of power; whether it is a thing that can be possessed; how it is exercised; what its effects are and how we can now them. Perhaps power is a thing, like money, that can be used to influence others. Perhaps it is just a word that is an alias for a strategic and tactical grid of relations that uses language, ideology to create truths and goods. Even so, it is my deep belief that structural violence implies non-egalitarian and non-mutual social dynamics, the features of which I will explore in a later chapter on sado-masochism. First, though, I must consider the basic inter-relational characteristics of human beings, i.e., how we relate to each other; how we structure our relationships; and how think of relations with non-human, sentient beings.

We can imagine a continuum encapsulating the most mundane behaviors between human beings and deep structures in social infra-structure, language, and institutions. At every level, there are common practices that are mediated by technologies of power that colonize us consciously and unconsciously. We live these common practices daily as we traverse our hodological maps, primarily interacting with family, friends, work colleagues, and strangers along our typical routes. Components of power come from custom, habit, tradition, law, etiquette, religion, geography, education, politics, science – every major institution of a society – as they are interpreted by each nodal point – a person – as they are manifested in human relationships of all kinds.

While it is true that some power comes from the state and ultimately from the dominators, because of the structural unconscious, and because of the implied consent I addressed earlier, in the end it comes from everywhere, and traverses everywhere. We become participants in it; embedded in it; indoctrinated by it; and ultimately produced by it, to the extent we do not engage in insurrectionist resistance. I suspect that this is part of why it is hard to detect and resist: it is an unclear target.

It is my view that capitalism supports a system of oppression and repression, as I have outlined. In this perspective, power is something held by the wealthy and the powerful, such as money, property, and opportunities. Those with it repress those without. That is the classic line. But there is a second step, which involves indoctrination and mass deception. This surpasses strategies of simple repression, and inverts them into strategies of complacence, agreement, permission, and production. Repression does not end, but it does produce another dimension that can be largely unconscious, is structural, and which inverts repression into production.

In this system, each of us becomes a nodal point of power, passing it, transmitting it, agreeing to it, and producing it. The repressed become complicit in their own repression. Each person, therefore, exists at a socio-political location within and through which complex, multi-dimensional vectors pass. As we agree to them or they are forced on us, we become “selves.” This illuminates how it is that power is embedded into structure as well as a function of conscious and unconscious forces, concatenating and integrating.

There are, therefore, intentional elements built into structure, but at the level of roles or classes of individuals. We can see how different cultures have different structures and, therefore, different systems of intentionalities, unconscious and conscious. This helps us understand how structure underlies our cultural values, for example, our choice to maintain a capitalist system that exploits most people. Some individuals desire to possess money and property to fulfill a psychological goal. They acquire these items through intentional means and participate in inter-relational dynamics with others who might be exploited or harmed by them.

Because there are so many people, it seems an impossible task to analyze the behavior of billions of people, individually. Instead, it becomes more feasible to consider the various classes of individuals, the dynamics within which we situate our lifeworld, and to make judgments about the outcome-structures, as they relate to oppression, power, and violence. We can also analyze intentional structures between individuals of a type and other individuals of another type. This can help us understand social structures that are laden with violence, and inter-relational dynamics that are, as well.

To some, it has seemed positive that we have a system comprised of industrial-capitalism, competition, regulations, and laws that are designed to drive production. We hear of financially successive people living the good life, gaining the esteem of their colleagues, and acquiring properties, money, people, and other items they value. We also hear about people at the other end of the spectrum, the very poor, who live in abject misery, but we are indoctrinated into belief systems that ignore these phenomena. These are the invisible, forgotten people who never have enough to eat; whose shelter is non-existent; and who always lack a fair share. We engage in various perceptual deceptions about these matters, in such ways that we retain our positive ideologies about capitalism even though the truth is otherwise.

Said in another way, the sum of our intentionalities usually – and I think always at the cultural level – leads to unpredictable consequences. Right before our very eyes we are seeing how capitalism continues to distribute more wealth to the wealthy and take the remaining wealth of the poor. If this trend continues, at some point we would be able to assert that the wealthy own all the wealth and that the poor own none. Thus, building an economic theory on human desire and a structure of individualism, autonomy, and capitalism – even though it appears positive – unfortunately does not lead to a well-functioning social state. It is, therefore, my belief that there is a relationship between the negative subtext of capitalism and resulting violence.

Let’s break these parts down into three regions to help us clarify our understanding. First, there are the conscious and unconscious intentionalities of specific individuals. Second, there are the dyads, roles, groups, and classes of individuals that form common patterns of intentionalities, but these are not from specific individuals. Third, there are the structures that form from these first two. While it is possible to analyze specific intentionalities of specific people, to understand how they lead to structure, it may be less feasible to do this as a universal project for a population. Instead, it is more feasible to do this in terms of the types of intentionalities, then link these with structural elements.

It would be a valuable project to link intentionalities with structure in both directions because we could potentially create implementations for important political goals. However, even beyond the complexity, we do not have a closed analytical system. In historical analysis, we are constantly evolving, which is the work of the individual and social, ontologically transcendent dimension. This precludes us from forming a fully systematic understanding of strategies and tactics in a society. Thus, there are foundational paths for thinking and action, and within these social paths, there is room for specific, individual choices. There is also the unknown, often unpredictable future within which we have some influence.

One of the chief areas of interest for our purposes is Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory, in which he argues that the selfish interests of individual agents will lead to an equilibrium of supply and demand, and thereby maximize the best interests of society. It would be intriguing and perhaps useful to see how individual actions lead to structures of social distribution, as modified by various levels of governmental regulation. At this point, however, we see that capital attracts capital, and that there is a rapidly growing and inequitable shift of money and good moving to the dominators and the wealthy. I am particularly interested in this type of analytic, but moreover, the types of self-structures it involves, and the types of self-structures that lead to both structural and individual violence.

In reverse, I am also interested in how structural and subjective violence modify the various topologies of self-structures, all within a capitalist-industrialist lifeworld. Even thought, at this point, it seems a daunting task to make analytic correlations between the behavior of specific agents and structure, or vice versa, we might first approach the task of understanding structure, hierarchical power, and the actions of individuals within types of relationships. For example, there is a structure that contextualizes the relationship between doctor and patient; lawyer and client; husband and wife. Although we might argue that each instantiation of these types is unique, I would hypothesize that there are common power dynamics with variations that could be analyzed secondarily. In general, I think my hypothesis leads back to a basic premise that there is structure which is, itself, comprised off commonalities – recognizable patterns – that shape the very way we talk to each other.

At an even deeper level, the languages we use contain within them power structures, values, and expectations of the speakers who use them. Furthermore, and with even greater interest, I am interested in the unconscious noosphere, the mindscape that is isomorphic with and that duplicates the social structures within the bodies and minds of individual agents. I assume that each one of us has a different level of awareness of how structural strategies shape and influence – perhaps even determine – the way that we agents think, feel, and act tactically within structure. I suppose that some agents do not understand at all the way that structures influence their thinking and behavior. Likewise, I suppose that some agents have some understanding. Why is this important? I believe that what we don’t know and understand, we cannot change. To the extent that we do not have perspective about the underlying paradigm in which we live, we lack empowerment and facility to examine it, analyze it, understand it, and change it.

I contend that the logic of any Western power grid – both structural and subjective elements – is based on the logic of industrial-capitalism. This logic acts as a bulwark of power within which each human agent acts – shaping, mediating, conditioning, and influencing our behaviors both consciously and unconsciously. Depending upon where a person is located in the strategic level of relevant power relations, their behavior is structurally contained, just as is the behavior of those corresponding agents within the same strategic field.

There are many examples of this strategic map of power relations, for instance, an average student at a public high school is limited in his academic and attendance behavior depending upon his social class, race, gender, class rank. A medical professional’s testimony about the events in an operating room is weighed relative to his or her station relative to others in the room. Normally, a chief surgeon’s testimony outweighs a nurse’s testimony. Here’s another: In a competitive professional industry – for example in major law firms – there are rules young associates must follow for promotion and bigger salaries, but these are all governed by structural expectations, that some know and that some do not. If the master signifier is capitalism, then all actions are ultimately evaluated, structured by capitalist values and weights instead of other values.

Moreover, all other values and truths are interpreted in terms of the master signifier, which means that our very understanding of the suppressed and marginalized elements is distorted. Insurgencies, insurrections, violations, modifications, battles, wars, and other conflict can change these rules but are still contained within the master signifier and its constellation of effects. In a sense, this can be explained by the notion of worlds. Specific actions make some more likely and others less likely. Some actions appear together, and others are suppressed together. This is a matter we can understand philosophically, psychoanalytically, and politically with the assistance of mathematical category theory, a topic for a companion text.

Thus, in my conception, the master signifier founds a world. Different master signifiers create different worlds. In these world choice-constructions, once a new master signifier attains dominance, then it both suppresses other world possibilities and structures all human conscious and unconscious interpretation, motivation, values, virtues, and knowledges. The field of possible behaviors is logically more constructed than the correlative field of possible thoughts, although thoughts that break with the matrix also change behavioral possibilities. This implies struggle. This more deeply implies the possibility of transcendence. We will consider these possibilities further into this text, but first let’s consider the effect power has on the bodies of humans. This assumption seems reasonable given that violence comes from the actions of humans. It is physical and comes from our bodies. It is physical and bodily in its nature even though it is structured by thought and language.

To help me in my discussion, I refer to the work of Michel Foucault, in his Discipline and Punish. In this work, he outlines a genealogy of the Western body as docile, malleable, and a receptacle-transmitter of power relations. This is the thesis that our bodies and minds act as nodal points in the matrices of power. He argues that the concept of “individual” is socially constructed and is based upon categories produced by the social sciences. He says that the emergence of the constructed individual is an effect of the power relationships existing at this time in Western history.

This is an arresting and intriguing idea, that power does not just operate in our minds but that it is invests itself in our very bodies. In Discipline, Foucault also makes the claim that power, which he calls “bio-power,” is now positive and producing rather than merely repressive and closing. This implies that we live out power within our very bodies, no matter our level of awareness of these processes. Also keep in mind that the government is, itself, a nodal point and relay for power relations. Thus, bio-power is concerned with two domains. One is the administration of the social body in activities such as human reproduction. The second is the manipulation of human bodies.

According to this conception, the state invests in fostering life and promoting the growth and care of populations. Interest in human sexuality, production, and health becomes paramount. Scientific knowledge of the human body and its processes explodes. But the state is also interested in the human body as an object to be manipulated. A technology of the body as an object of power is formed, the goal of which is to produce a human being who can be treated as a docile and productive body. This is discipline, an aspect of this new conception of power.

Within this evolution of the effects of power, now viewed as both repressing and producing, there has also been a series of changes with regard to how power has an impact on the bodies of individuals. In the seventeenth century (in some European countries), when power was exercised by a sovereign upon its subjects, it was imprinted directly on their bodies through torture and other forms of punishment. By the nineteenth century this manifestation of power gave way to a much more complex set of power relationships wherein people became docile and mute, dominated by techniques of surveillance.

Visible forms of punishment were supplemented by new forms that were, and are, more difficult to see. For Foucault, a docile subject is not autonomous and is easily manipulable by power effects. It is produced and guided by the effects of power. This produced subject is different from the repressed subject, who is allowed to produce himself as a subject, although his aims and desires are repressed. A “mute” subject is one who does not speak autonomously, not one who does not speak at all. For instance, with regard to sexuality, the effects of power forced mute subjects to speak about it in a certain way, using a certain discourse which was full of value assumptions that were instituted by the effects of power. In this docile and mute state of affairs, behavioral control by discipline has replaced brute torture. Because there are many more points of the emanation of power the state is now mostly a superstructural embodiment of the totality of power relationships. It is important to show how the effects of modern power relationships on the body have changed over the years.

The goal of contemporary disciplinary technology is to control the behavior of individuals through self-surveillance and systems of normalization. Just like in the penal system, docile bodies are utilized by society for economic production and are mimetic, mechanized, and desirous. That is, their productivity typically originates from the effects of power, not from the autonomy of individuals who engage in resistance.

In this system, subjects are forced to comply with institutional and governmental control or suffer punishment. By mechanizing this system, individual subjects are offered various roles to play that have already been established by governmental and bureaucratic systems. This disciplinary technology is pervasive, and both obvious and subtle, as it permeates relationships between individuals and the state, and within individuals in their inter-relationality.

In addition to Discipline, we see analytical analogues in Birth of the Clinic and in Madness and Civilization, in which Foucault studies the medical gaze, effects on docile bodies, constitution of mental illness and immorality, and the condemnation of the unproductive. This perpetuates a political technology of the body in which can read a history of the relations of power. By substituting out vulgar forms of violence against bodies, and substituting in the gaze of the Other, which forms a system of self-surveillance, we produce our own individual morality that actually comes from the government. This forces us to conform our own behavior and thinking to current patterns of morality. I hypothesize that ontically and concretely, this forces us to comply with violent algorithms that invade our minds, bodies, social relationships, and presencing within the physical world.

These algorithms, in contemporary culture, are violent. They are delivered through major social institutions such as medicine, religion, education, military, art, science, politics, and love, creating disciplinary codes – normalization – that force us to produce our desires and our truths within them. This includes work policies, ethics codes, architecture, interior design – all of it carefully constructed to control, dominate, and maximize efficiency. In this type of system, our bodies and minds are determined. This is the structuralization of individual subjects. We are constituted this way. This topology of subjectivity begins to look like there is no self-constituting subjectivity possible – that we are the playthings of language and culture.

What is at stake here is profound. Not only is this system totalitarian with transcendental closures, but it also implies the erosion and destruction of the integrated, whole human being. By fracturing the mind and body with disciplinary technologies, including the normal, right, and good ways to play a role in society, this sort of totalitarianism exercises absolute constitutive power over subjects. Thus, the cultural noetic structure is replicated within all the sets of subjects – the individual and the social are, therefore, isomorphic. The matrix of power relations in a society or culture is deposited onto and into the minds and bodies of its individuals. Thus, we can map an ontology of bodies and of subjects onto a ontology of culture through the phenomenological method. It is within the body that is given through governmentalization that we “construct” our personal identity, our individuality. It is this individuality that operates as the critical agent who engages in this analysis and inspection.

Disciplinary technologies operate, therefore, through surveillance and through discourses of and about normalization. They seem impossible to escape in any meaningful way, and therefore, our thinking and behavior are always conscripted and limited. Deviations from the norm are punished, and the violator often loses participation in the role he or she chose not to play. I believe this goes further than the power-knowledge formations involved in many social institutions to include all dialectical processes between the true-false and the right-wrong. If we apply this hypothesis to all major existential domains, then we can see that power is involved in all questions about self, sociality, the natural-material world, spirituality, temporality, uncertainty, and all other ontological questions.

If power is this pervasive, infecting the very way we think about everything, then there is no perspective that transcends it, and no obvious way to escape it. Thus, discourses about values, morality, etiquette, law, behavior, are all infected by relations of power. This necessarily includes values concerning violence. To be sure, we can argue about the definition of violence. We can have different interpretations of it. We can have different value orientations toward it. Yet, if we apply our axioms, we must conclude that our perspectives about it are determined and constituted by relations of power that use techniques of self-surveillance and normalization. To the extent that our perspectives about violence deviate from the norm, we would necessarily be divided against ourselves, wrestling against both external and internal norms, one produced by the Other, and the other produced by ourselves in conjunction with that Other. In addition, we might not be aware of much of what goes on in that regard. Even so, this battle occurs both in the mind and in the body, causing effects in both domains.

Let’s next delve into the notion that we are ineluctably affected by language, values, ontological structure, sense of reality, behavioral reinforcements, and all other aspects of shaping behavior in culture. It is difficult to believe that we can ever be completely aware. It is more plausible to believe that we are often very much unaware of truths about ourselves, others, the material world, and metaphysical questions concerning uncertainties. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that we are affected by forces and influences that we do not know about it or do not understand. One way to talk about these forces is through the idea of power as an alias for these forces and influences.

We can talk about these influences and forces in straightforward ways by considering language and those other social and cultural elements that I just listed. We always inherit a culture. Our lifeworld is always within a culture. Thus, everything we experience always has a foundation within a culture. This foundation, I believe, is based on social commitments to signifying chains. It is these chains that manifest value, claims to truth, and claims to the right and the good.

I think it is accepted knowledge that a society or culture is structured by many elements, as both Lacan and Foucault assert, which can be discussed through discourses of power and language. Relationships are complex and unequal because people play different and unique roles in society and culture, with different degrees and levels of influence. This is more complex than the idea that power comes from above and suppresses people below, which is part of the equation but not all. In truth, we all produce power and, therefore, contribute to a complex matrix social matrix. Because “power” is not just repressive but is, instead, productive and participatory, we can shift the question from who holds power to an analysis of power relations. This is a valuable approach because it can help us understand why people have certain beliefs and behaviors rather than others – why people are affected by prominent signifiers – why people are affected unconsciously. This also explain why Internet media powerfully structures our thinking at a foundational level, from the ground up. This also diagnoses how difficult it is to gain perspective about these deeper levels of noospheric space. This also explains why people are drawn to thinking and behavior that they eschew. This is the divided self.

This model explains cultural paradigms, for example, a Cartesian-Newtonian universe, that women do or do not have the right to vote in elections, that white males are privileged, that animals are ontologically inferior and do not have rights, that some violence is legal and morally acceptable. We can just as easily state the negation of these values, in an alternative universe, but this would be a different cultural paradigm with different values and beliefs. We are, therefore, held in place by these underlying systems of power, for they structure everything we think and do.

An important query is whether we can gain perspective about them, have a critical view of them, and transform our position in them, or contribute to a transformation of them. Thus, while it is true that we have a sense of agency within these structures, the structures themselves can be largely unknown and obfuscated. This implies that our choices are already prefigured – reasons prefigured – behavioral options prescribed, for example, chess or checkers. Yet, this is not to say that the noetic structure of our intentionality cannot be critically examined. This is the phenomenological, philosophical-anthropological question of transcendence.

One major problem in this thinking, which I will examine in a proposed Volume 2 of this work, is whether we could ever get groups of individuals together in a meaningful, consistent, and authentic way so as to intentionally design this underlying structure. Foucault does not believe we can. Sartre, in his Critique of Dialectical Reason, which I also examine, believes that this possibility is highly problematic, which outlines in his theory of groups. This is a problem in social-political philosophy that I have been working on for decades. This is at the root of the problem I articulate in this book: whether the human anthropology is doomed to violence or whether we have enough freedom to make a different choice – with a different evolutionary path – and a different future. For me, the question is whether we can develop enough intellectual and moral perspective, noetic intentionality, and faculty of will that make these changes in a conscious and reflective way. This is the notion of taking our-selves to task or thinking against ourselves.

In this political struggle, everything each of us does, within the sub-field of our individual life, either promotes or hinders other actions. This is the realm of resistance and freedom, of which we have degrees of awareness. Each action contributes to the underlying, dynamic field of actions – the matrix of power – and becomes a part of its structuralization of current and future actions. Obviously, this structure changes through history, as individual agents act and are prevented from acting by the structure itself. We can see that this is a vision of struggle for these micro-fields of influence – of power itself – as human agents strive to gain influence in their social lives. I also note that our nation, our cultures, and our societies are primarily determined by the master signifier of capitalism, commodification, and [ontological] having, which perpetuates a win-lose social dynamic, especially because of the valorization of competition. I suspect that this [egocentric] drive to “win,” which is positively reinforced by the capitalist-competitive social model, is arguably a factor in motivational structures that lead to violence. This, however, does not preclude struggle, power reversals, and transformation, a subject I take up in a succeeding volume in this series on praxis.

The reason I believe this is true is that within the ontology of our self-structure, we are condemned to evaluate our interpretations of our experience, even though it may be true that we distort, close, or alter them. We are also condemned to seek meaning and value through our behavior and especially our behavior within the human population as we try to construct a self within our relations with Others. This is to attain a sense of a stable self- structure even though this is the futile strategy that is promotes by the possessive self, through capitalism and competition. This is the desire for an ontological fullness which, in principle, is impossible. However, it is not too difficult to see that the structures which promote a subjective, insatiable drive to quench constant desire can easily lead a human subject into an egocentric, narcissistic path in which he does not see the Other, recognize the Other’s life, value, or need; in which he loses his capacity for empathy and compassion; and in which he develops distorted, false beliefs to support his aggression, ones that lead to violence.

Let’s now delve more deeply into the structural elements that inform the self – how we are influenced by them without being aware of them – and how this is challenge to the resistance and liberation. I remind the reader that the subject of this volume is to analyze and diagnose the condition of violence within the human anthropology – to see if we are fated for it or whether we have the self-structural elements to transcend it.

I take it as common knowledge that humans are self-reflexive; that we think about who we are; and that this process is inter-relational. As Foucault would have it, we are “individualized,” requiring each of us to submit to bureaucratic examination and taxonomic placement for the major aspects of our lives. But we do this individually, as individuals, and this starts when we are born unto specific families, in specific regions, each with its own set of micro-values, principles, ethical codes, etiquettes, and truths.

According to Lacan, Foucault, and even Sartre, we attach ourselves early in life to various orientations in being, and placements within the body politic – society – culture. As children, we are forced into it, into various locations and intersections, depending upon the factors I have mentioned. This is our facticity, according to Heidegger. The situations we are forced into and the choices we make within them determine our personal identities. It is important to note that much of this process objectivizes us, turns us into objects, as it were. I find informally that these identities often revolve around socio-economic status, sexuality and gender, choice of occupation/profession, and religion, among other domains. For Foucault, we are constrained and pinned by our personal identities. What this means is that all the forces of power within a culture bear down upon individuals, in ways that are determined by a person’s locatedness within the social matrix. We can assume that various rewards and goods, as well as punishments and deprivations come from each location within a matrix. These are the structural forces that push humans into beliefs, values, and behavior. These are the forces that resist autonomous choices otherwise. It is a dialectic between governmentalization and individual freedom.

Let’s acknowledge that the state forces its way onto its population, constantly seeking ways to subjugate, control, and manage its individuals. These days that management centers around productivity and capitalism. This means that we are all categorized in all state-important domains, for example, driver’s license, census, all forms of taxation, medical, legal, moral, religious, and any other area a locale finds important. This categorization process, therefore, utilizes underlying knowledges like the law, biology, health, psychology, religion, and so forth. Furthermore, we are categorized based on statistical dispersions such as the bell curve, each one of us subjected to these knowledges through their individuating power. It is inescapable. If we occupy certain positions in these taxonomic dispersions, we enjoy positive rewards, for example, status, income, choice of mates, ease of life, and other opportunities. On the other hand, if we occupy other positions, we suffer negative rewards, punishment, and so forth.

These categories are distributed based on what is considered normal, right, and good; in our present circumstance, these values are often defined by the signifying constellation of commodification, acquisition, and capitalism. Thus, any time someone attempts a gesture of freedom that tries to break free from these structures, unless there is some kind of positive capitalist valence involved, they are thwarted behaviorally, attitudinally, corporately, socially, legally, and otherwise. These social and cultural resistances are strong, and therefore they affect the way individuals attach themselves to anything of value. In a sense, they are always mischaracterizations, and in a Lacanian frame, are potentially mis-recognized, resisted, accepted, or distorted by their recipients. This is why we never feel fully ourselves as we each engage orientations, strategies, and tactics relative to our objectivized selves. As knowledges change, individuals change. Yet, let’s not forget that this process is never ending, pervasive, and divide us within ourselves with both conscious and unconscious elements. Thus, sometimes our inner self agrees with our objectivized self, and other times, disagrees. This is the constant dialectic that causes stress, aggression, and in some cases, violence.

In this structural system, unconscious factors also create pathways for self-improvement, growth, advancement, actualization, ideals, and all other related teleological instrumentalization of human motivation. Whether or not someone has originary experience that matches these goals and aims becomes suppressed as we are pushed into objective discourses that provide ontological pathways. It my personal experience that most people don’t consider this ontological under-fact but, instead, live in the ontic, everyday reality of the system that has already been structuralized for them. This is a crucial fore-element in a system of normalization and self-surveillance that reinforces cultural values that have already been chosen in the past. This is why it can be difficult to resist, to be unique, or to autonomous choose a new way in the world. Humans, therefore, risk much when they try to transform societies and cultures.

A model than can help us understand how we are tied to the values underlying our conscious-level personal identities is the multiple-self doctrine. Here, our conscious self-system sits atop very complex unconscious processes. These unconscious processes are isomorphic to the very same ones in culture, and they permeate each person’s “self,” thereby eroding its boundary with culture. However, this conceptual move helps us understand how easy it is to commit to values prominent in our culture, and how difficult it is to resist them, for example, sexuality, capitalism, attitudes toward those from a different race, and violence. Thus, if we live in a sexually repressed culture, we are pushed in this direction and punished when we do not comply. If we live in a capitalist culture, it is difficult to live a different way. If we live in a violent culture, it is acceptable to support violence. It is difficult to violate the boundaries of all three of these value systems either because others won’t understand, or they will disagree morally. Articulating more detailed theory about why this is so is the subject of this book. This is my aim, to clarify.

If we are desiring beings – if the objects of our desires are prefigured – then culture provides us answers to our desires and to the “truth” of who we are. Thus, instead of creating ourselves anew, we simply find out where we are located in culture. This becomes a question of choosing, to the extent we can do so, where we locate ourselves through personal identity, to the extent we can do so. “Discovering” ourselves just is this experience of location. It is not the creation of original, or partially original subjectivity, or autonomy. The question I have at this point in the discussion is whether or not we are completely determined by structure. If we are, then we are doomed to the violent subjectivity I outline. If we are not, then how can we clarify the factors that allow us creative autonomy for free subjectivity, a kind of subjectivity that avoids isomorphism with the power relations extant in one’s culture?

(forthcoming, 2021)

Here is a portion of chapter 2:

Chapter 2 – Logos of Capitalism
When we speak of a mode of being of “having,” manifested in an economic worldview of capitalism, we cannot avoid the fact that we live in an industrialist-technological economy. This mean that large corporations build machinery that uses humans and natural resources to produce consumer goods in which everything is commodified and has a free market value. This is what industrial civilization is and what it does. In my view, this is an aspect of capitalism that is foundational to an understanding of violence. Later in this essay, I will explore the types of self-structures that support the kind of industrial capitalism that we have at play.

As I have just explained, our culture values individualism and autonomy so much that it has become a deep element in our socio-political structure. This is liberalism, which holds that the basic unit of society is the individual and not communities or groups of people, or more radically, complete ecosystems in which humans consider and respect all species.

We can find an example of this type of liberalist, possessory-oriented type of self-structure in the creation and development of the original colonies and to the development of the U.S. This sort of ideology started with a hegemony of theocracy in which the king and the church had all the power, a top-down economic, social, political, and ideological power that animated the development of the U.S. and much of the western world. This is a hierarchy of ontological dis-parity.

The individuals who started the U.S. did not have motivations that aimed at human rights because they were mercantile capitalists trying to break free of the Church of England and its ontological hierarchy with God at the top, followed by religious leaders, the king, nobles, clergy, aristocrats, military; then the merchants, traders, craftsmen, and common laborers. This is an indenture system with a system of power that is held as rights, money, property, and laws that force those lower on the pyramid to comply. Ideologically, lower classes obeyed because they were indoctrinated into the false belief that it was God’s will.

In 1215, some of the aristocracy forced King John to sign the Magna Carta, requiring the King to renounce some privileges and comply with legal procedures, especially due process. This shifted the balance of power relations by requiring that the king and the church be bound by the law and not above it, and that citizens had redress against their government. This caused civil war because of the unsettling of the longstanding ontological hierarchy. This was the First Baron’s War.

The American Revolution was similar, with the rising merchant-capitalist class rising against the king and upper aristocracy of England. By removing the king and aristocracy from power, they would ascend up the hierarchical rung to rule a system of power relations with them at the top. Rich, white, privileged males were defined as persons, and everyone else property or an admixture of both. With that system, however, we can see that the ruling classes dominated those lower on the power rung with the hopes of converting natural resources into private accumulations of wealth. Because only the favored, privileged class could vote, they enacted laws that would protect their position at the top end of the ontological pyramid. More so, they perpetrated a lie on everyone not in power that their ruling position was a blessing from God – that they deserved it – that they were favored. In that system, 95 – 99% of the population was not favored or privileged. The privileged made everyone believe that they had the God-given right to accumulate wealth. Moreover, they perpetrated a social lie that everyone else had the opportunity to ascend the social-economic ladder.

Before these market economies emerged in the west, they were embedded in moral economies of care, concern, and responsibility. Virtues were inculcated in the population, which served the community as a whole, not only a few individuals. Tendencies toward private acquisition and accumulation were thereby tempered by community norms, anchoring elders, mutual obligation, and moral sensibilities like empathy and solidarity. These are the norms, expectations, and shared power relations that the capitalist-industrialist destroyed. This, in turn, allowed those in power to violate community standards whenever they chose to do so, situating their obligations within contractual frameworks that they dominated and controlled. This allows the dominators to live in accord with their narcissistic, egocentric interests that stemmed from an individualist moral economy. Let us not forget that contracts and contract law always favor the party who has more situational power.

Even from the early days of the U.S., the distribution of wealth in the U.S. was disproportionate: Most people were indentured servants, slaves, or working poor. On top, there were a few individuals that owned most of the property and money. Laws were fashioned to protect these accumulations of private wealth, regulate the economy, and shore up infrastructure that would facilitate the movement of trade. Even the federal banks have origins in private ownership by wealthy European and American families. In response, there is a history of rebellions, insurgencies, riots, and constant conflict from the dispossessed, the disempowered, and the poor who reacted to this distributive injustice caused by capitalism.

Classical liberalism assumes the value of an individual’s sovereignty, but this is measured by one’s economic-political station. Just to say that each person has individual sovereignty is but a theoretical construct, one that finds its reality in concrete political life, metaphysical assumptions about the basic unit of society, and assumptions about distributive practices. Thus, individualism and the protection of private property has a positive valence to its expression unless that property is unequally distributed and there are no fair procedures to redistribute it. In liberalism, there is a false belief and indoctrination to the idea that what each person’s situation has become is determined by their autonomous, intentional choosing. This belief percolates and permeates the social fabric, across all media, and becomes structuralized into our very discourse and thinking. Furthermore, in this system, it becomes morally justified to follow the rules and not justified to violate them, because of the false belief and ideology and that we are all equal before the law.

We can understand liberalism, individualism, and the possessive-self better if we consider other alternatives and assumptions. For example, if the basic unit of society is the group or community; if society is structured by language, systems of power, ideology, and social/legal rules; and if we deconstruct the idea that all people are truly free to direct their own lives or make significant changes to the culture, then we may come to a different understanding of the values we hold so dearly. We can see how inequitable relations of power, distribution of resources, and violence can be embedded in all foundation institutions, laws, and even language, which makes it harder to discern. This can help us understand how industrial capitalism leads to erosions in the respect and integrity of individual persons, and violence. Later in this essay, I will address this difference between structural violence and subjective violence, as well as the different motivations for it. Let’s continue, however, to make additional observations about liberalism.

In a liberalist, capitalist economic system, the rich use the labor of the poor and the privatization of common resources without moral constraint under than the law – which is promulgated by the rich – thoroughly embedding oppressive (and violent) structures directly into all social realms. This sets up conditions for subjective violence, when individuals who lose in this system break the legal rules civilly or criminally. Thus, the shift from the king to the economically powerful quietly denuded the right of individual sovereignty as a natural right, rendering the poor powerless to the structural violence of the wealthy.

Unregulated capitalism-industrialism carries with it these deep assumptions – and few moral constraints to oppress the weaker – as we see in contemporary society. In his, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argues that invisible hand of the market would obviate the need for governmental interference. However, only a few years ago, Thomas Piketty, in his Capital in the 21st Century, argues that without governmental interference, capitalism results in the kind of income and capital disparities we see in contemporary society.

In liberalism, government has a laissez-faire, or hands-off attitude toward the economy, save for enforcing contracts, whose terms are dominated by the wealthy. This policy of non-interference extended to the drafting of the Bill of Rights, which guarantees certain individual freedoms such as speech and religion, as long as you have enough power and money to presence them – these freedoms. We see this embedded in civil rights, which we enjoy to levels that depend upon our station in the hierarchies of being. This enjoyment of civil rights extends also extends across party lines because liberalism has always promoted capitalism and does so today. Both parties are based on liberalist principles, and both parties support capitalism, albeit in different complicated ways. Thus, what looks like political choice is always animated by the underlying worldview of industrialist-capitalism.

After the Depression, liberalism took the position that the federal government has to interfere in the economy to maximize the efficiency and production of capitalism. In this viewpoint, the government also promulgates labor standards whose purpose is to maximize the healthy and output of the labor force. Even so, in this system, the basic unit of society continues to be the individual – legally, religiously, socially, and politically. Foucault called this tendency “individuating power,” in which each person’s identity lay at the intersection of all human sciences and discourses, subject to their power and to governmental influence.

By separating groups of people – coalitions, organizations, towns, and applying social, legal, and political principles to individuals, the wealthy who own most of everything are able develop and sustain a deep structuralized violence into the very fabric of society based on the axiom of ontological hierarchy. Given that liberalism is a form of idealism, liberalists often fall into the deception that the world can be politically transformed by ideas when in reality it can only be changed by transforming the power structure of society and its ontological structure. Maybe ideas can do that; maybe they cannot, but it is easy to see how they always lie at the bottom of ideology. They are ideology.

There is a further consideration in liberalism, which involves self-deception and mass cultural deception, which I explore in a later chapter. A liberalist society tries to suppress and distort how power relations structuralize reality, values, ideology, forms of life, morality, and the like. For example, we are taught to believe that race and gender have essentialist or biological foundations when, in fact, this is false. Or, for example, we are taught that animals do not have as much intrinsic value as humans do, or that they cannot suffer or feel pain like do. The belief that we have dominion over other life forms and that we are more important or more valuable than they are is, in fact, a false belief but allows us to neglect, abuse, and hideously treat individuals form other species.

The key element here is widespread cultural deception, which sways people’s beliefs and values in distorted ways. Further, if this kind of false ideology pervasively shapes the mind of a society, we start believing certain things to be universally true when, in fact, they are always false. Unfortunately, they can shape the cultural mind so profoundly that even those humans who are harmed by them, accept, choose, and desire their continued suffering. This plays right into the deep algorithm of liberalism, which is that people choose their life circumstances.

tentative curriculum for school year 2021-2022

EPIS Seminars 2021-2022

Existential Psychoanalytic
Institute & Society

2021-2022
Seminar
Curriculum

1ST DRAFT 01.01.21

*There may be small modifications in the reading depending upon
the needs of the EPIS community.

*Default is Mountain Time. Please adjust your
calendar depending upon your time zone.

Session 1:
September 10 & September 11 (2021)

FRIDAY:
Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Kristeva
Powers of Horror, Columbia University, 1982

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology
(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Beauvoir
The Ethics of Ambiguity, Open Road Media, 2018

SATURDAY
Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10 a.m.-Noon)
Zizek
The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, 2009

Critical Theory/Post-Structuralism
(Saturday, Noon – 2 p.m.)
Foucault
Mental Illness and Psychology, Foreword and Part 1, University of California Press, 1987

Session 2:
December 3 & December 4 (2021)

FRIDAY
Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Kristeva
Powers of Horror, Columbia University, 1982

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology
(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Beauvoir
Ethics of Ambiguity, Open Road Media, 2018

SATURDAY
Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10 a.m.-Noon)
Zizek
The Sublime Object of Ideology Verso, 2009

Critical Theory
Foucault
Mental Illness and Psychology, Part 2, University of California Press, 1987

Session 3:
March 5 & 6 (2022)

FRIDAY
Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Kristeva
Hatred and Forgiveness, Columbia, 2012

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology
(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Jean Wahl
Transcendence and the Concrete, Fordham, 2017

SATURDAY
Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10 a.m.-Noon)
Zizek
The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, 2009

Critical Theory
(Saturday, 10-2 p.m., MT)
Foucault
Madness and Civilization, Vintage, 1988


Session 4
June 4 and June 5 (2022)

FRIDAY
Critical Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Kristeva
Hatred & Forgiveness, Columbia, 2012

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology
(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Wahl
Transcendence and the Concrete, Fordham, 2017

SATURDAY
Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10 a.m.-Noon)
Zizek
The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, 2009

Foucault
Madness and Civilization, Vintage, 1988

January 1, 2021 version
EPIS curriculum, copyright, 2021-22
Official Version, Draft 1
EPIS Education
Copyright EPIS Education 2021-22

The Existential Psychoanalytic Institute & Society continues its successful growth and evolution after nearly 20 years of programs, seminars, and education. Our quarterly seminars are rigorous, and are oft-attended by psychoanalysts, psychologists, and philosophers at all levels, bringing cutting edge and classic theory into active dialectic amongst our members. Annual dues to access these amazing seminars is only $150.00, which by all professional standards, is affordable and competitive.

The EPIS Internet radio show is in its 8th year come the new year, discussing current topics, old topics, and topics of all kinds that we can discuss through the discourses of historical analysis, mathematics and logic, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and critical theory. EPIS Press publishes many of these transcripts, which you can find at Amazon.com, and which are sold for very inexpensive prices. They are informal in presentation, as you might expect from a radio show, but are informative, and a good way to enter into some of these challenging and recondite conceptual issues.

EPIS Education continues its boutique, post-graduate educational programs for those interested in the more complex aspects of psychoanalysis and who want a post-graduate diploma as part of their background credentials. Even those these diplomas are not degrees (remember, this is post-degree education), they are particularly useful for professional and non-professional students of psychoanalysis. The programs can be structured as full-time and part-time, which allows flexibility and consonance within a candidate-student’s overall workload. They are rigorous but welcoming, and continue to provide a foundation for all.

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EPIS Directorship

The EPIS Psychoanalytic Institute is accepting papers for its 2020 conference on the meaning of freedom today, given current social and political structure, sophisticated technology, complex laws and regulations, the Internet, unprecedented levels of violence, and an unparalleled semio-capitalism and economy of commodification.
While looking to past theories in psychoanalysis and phenomenology is important, this conference will focus on new, creative ideas, concepts, and theories. The goal is to produce presentations and papers that explore innovative work in psychoanalysis and phenomenology as it pertains to the construction of self-constitution, autonomy, meaning, and freedom in a world that is hyper-dominated by the quest for acquisition, profit, and possession, and complex linguistic structures that create inertia, confusion, and sedimentation.
Our hope is to produce papers that explore alienated relationships between humans and structuralized semiology of capitalism of the lived world, life, and the given, and our contemporary understanding of psychoanalysis and phenomenology. This involves, necessarily, psychoanalytic thinking, critical theory, applied phenomenology, praxis, and potentials for transformative change, individually and collectively. Please refer to episjournal.com for policies.
Traditionally, however, psychologists and psychoanalysts will use APA-Style guide and philosophers will use the Chicago Manual of Style. Please also submit a paper for the 2020 journal issue even if you cannot attend the conference. Please submit these papers to Kevin Boileau, PhD, at kbradref@gmail.com.

In order to explore the meaning and value of authentic human being-ness—who we are and what we are seeking ontologically and existentially—we must address questions relating to an interpretation of being that prioritizes having and its relationship to the dialectic between being alone and being with Others. This starting point would be useful in helping us approach transcendental liberations within a master semiology of capitalism, the arch-meaning of our current historical period. This is its value.

Having is a primordial way that we exist in the world and a way that we interpret temporality. It is a mode of being that can be a futile attempt in the ontic realm to overcome ontological anxiety. In contrast, being itself, focusing on the ontological, projects directly into deeper levels of meaning that are mysterious and unknown. It is apparent that contemporary Western culture is preoccupied with having, creating greater distance from the awareness of what and who we are. Having is characterized by acquisitiveness, dominated by the worldview that the aim of life is fulfilled in proportion to what we possess. This tendency has evolved into a western civilization that is structurally regulated by acquisition, possession, and capitalistic structures.

We can attempt to possess many different sorts of things, such as material objects, people, and even ideas. We accumulate material objects for security, protection, and social status. We attach ourselves to people, especially romantic partners. We attach ourselves to our ideas, arranged in various domains such as the social, scientific, political, religious, and so forth. Learning has become systemized accumulation of facts, and intellectual value comes from the sheer amount of information or knowledge one can access and utilize. We consume the evening television news, buy newspapers, and seek information about the stock market. Formal education is this way too. These individual-social formations support, therefore, instrumental reasoning, which in turn, supports an interpretation of being that focuses on having.

In this mode of having, meaning comes primarily from the subject side of intentionality. Humans then utiize this existential mode to imbue everything in the world with our cultural and and personal, subjective values. This leads to a social and political system that encourages individual, idiosyncratic valuation and a subjectivism that become valorized in the bourgeois marketplace. This is a danger for phenomenology because it overshadows and hides the objective source of meaning. However, this goes even further; this desire to have goes all the way down into the foundation of our very consciousness, an inversion of an authentic access to and participation in being.

At this fundamental level, we regard our minds, our bodies, and our lives as things to be possessed. They are viewed as objects that we can keep or lose. Yet, there is a gap between the subject-possessor and the object-possessed because the subject alienates and isolates himself from those material objects he possesses. If I am what I possess, I will always be at a distance from those things. In this case, my possession is illusory because I will always fear the loss of anything I can have. This alienation results in ontological insecurity, which includes anxiety, meaningless, and emptiness, as I live in an isolated way among lifeless objects that are always at a distance from me. As I continue to chase those objects that I can “possess,” my being remains empty and superficial. What’s more, this anxiety drives us toward compulsive and violent forms of acquisitiveness – including selfishness, greed, and harm to others. Then we cannot stop ourselves and become ensconced in the purely subjective, losing connection to objective sources of meaning, living in a distorted and false anthropological conception. This is how we lose empathy.

I am interested in the motivation that underlies the urge to accumulate; about what is lacking that creates this motivation. Something seems missing but it is nothing in particular. It is just a state of nothing-ness. This is to say that there is a void—and emptiness—and we attempt to fill it by acquiring external objects. But this void is epi-phenomenal with consciousness, and impossible to fill by accumulating from the outside. Thus, as we experience with different degrees of awareness, this lack of being that we experience cannot be affected by having. This is so whether the having is emotional, perceptual, imaginative, cognitive, spiritual, or material. It is the seat of transcendence, which is the locus of freedom – and its opposites.

What I have described is a loss of the presencing of deeper levels of meaning. It is a loss of sensitivity to and awareness of the transcendental function in consciousness. Thus, we seek having and preclude ourselves from experiencing being except in an alienated way. Derivatively, we lose awareness of the consequences of this alienation by being ensconced in having. The depth of this mode extends further, for even our spiritual and epistemological quests may occur in the mode of having, as we purchase and read one (self-help) book after the other and try several religions. Then, we confuse ourselves even more, as what we believe ought to fulfill us is only more of the same distorted orientation in being. This effect multiplies as we use the Internet as our library of satisfaction.

For example, many belief systems give us the possibility of having a meaningful life and a kind of immortality that comes from identifying a positive, teleological end of some sort. If there are sought-after, “Good” places we can go to, then enlightenment and eternal life are things that we can obtain; they become things that we can have. We are taught to believe that we can gain happiness by a class, a book, or a consultation. Thus, we purchase these teleological goods as merchandise. These commodification process makes us feel good, as a kind of narcotic. It is satisfying because it fills up that nothingness even though its cost is an infinite destruction of life – an eradication of our presencing to life.

In contrast, authentic consciousness awakens to the mysterious dimension of our being, a participation and dialogue with meaning. We gain this by leaning in to it, pursing it, and remaining open and available to it. Instead of being something that we acquire, authentic consciousness is something that we allow to permeate our whole life. Within this orientation, philosophical foundations cannot be reduced to a system of dogmas or belief systems, for here we risk the danger that we would adopt the belief system instead of allowing authentic awareness into our being. This is the problem with accumulations of “knowledge” that we can have, with instrumental reasoning that is merely operational, which is unaccompanied by understanding, and access to critical availability to objective sources of meaning.

Once we can see our way through the problems created by the mode of having—an over-reliance on the subjective source of meaning—we can begin to re-approach the objective as source of meaning. It is then incumbent upon us to try to understand this dimension of our existence that leads us into mystery and transcendent freedom. For it lacks ontic, positivist forms of description and evaluation that enslave us through well-defined laws, values, and institutions.

When we focus ourselves on the objective source of meaning—on being—we are presented with the existential questions some people pursue and most people avoid, concerning the meaning of life, human potential, purpose, responsibility, virtue, value, and other challenging matters. These questions all are iterations of the Socratic question about what I ought to do with my life. These questions have no straight or easy answer, and they always focus on being and mystery. We are often tempted to answer these questions from the orientation of the mode of having (naturalism, intellectualism, positivism) because our cultures and societies are structuralized within this mode.

In addition, we are tempted to answer them in terms of our own cultural frames, knowing fully well the argument that we cannot transcend them. However, if we move from a having orientation to a transcendental orientation in being – a bracketing of having – focusing on the deeper existential questions, we can understand a) that these questions are always asked by particular people living in a particular time and place with a particular history and b) that we can always see the universal existentials within specific cultural enframings. We can see that our ways of articulating these questions and issues are at best provisional enunciations and we can, therefore, avoid existential sedimentations and dogma.

In order to avoid falling into these sedimentations, we must not only look to the structural forms of our answers. Otherwise, we risk losing the inner meaning of what they say. For example, we can see large differences between institutionalized forms of belief and the individuals who exist within these institutional forms. Contemporary protagonists sometimes become more concerned with justifying dogmas and creeds than with understanding the existential significance of these guides to life. These are animated by self-help books and Western happiness experts. Instead, we should be aware that the value of any belief lies in its ability to point us toward deeper truth. When we take the symbolic value of the belief to be final truth, that symbol precludes self-transcendence, and obscures that which it was formerly trying to disclose. Psychoanalytically, it is regressive. Phenomenologically, it creates closure and lacks availability.

There is always a transcendent element or quality to language because meanings cannot precisely and totally be fixed through that language although our bureaucracies, organizations, and corporations try very hard to do so. Through the transcendent function, meaning always escapes into a future horizon of possibilities unless we slip into the mode of having, as beliefs in their institutionalized form become a receptacle of facts and information, traded for future expected gain, in service of instrumentalized rationality. This implies cultural and individual relativism, which always results in subjectivism, which becomes a danger to phenomenology as corrective to positivisms. Furthermore, epistemological and theological answers to existential questions can rise to an idealized level, becoming experience-distant rather than experience near, but not approaching the amelioration of our emptiness, alienation, anxiety, and loneliness.

Addressing our basic situation in life from an existential phenomenological point of view will allow us to see the consequences of living in the mode of having and acquisition, focusing on the subjective. By looking at our initial state, we can see how we end up in the mode of having and how we suspend our use of theoretically-based judgments and confront the phenomena of life exactly as it presents itself. Let us consider the essential structures of our own existence, which I call “existentials.” Let me also suggest that it is very difficult to suspend our judgments that are based on culture, society, family, worldview, and so forth. Thus, whatever understanding we arrive at must only be tentative and preliminary, susceptible to revision and re-evaluation.

My goal here is to render a preliminary and simple account of the basic structures of human existence, which is our ontological framework for all the derivative beliefs, emotions, and behaviors we create and commit to in our specific cultural and social worlds. Phenomenology is the method that alerts us to various experiences in a pure, descriptive way. We can then catalogue them as a way of identifying the more basic ontological presuppositions of those experiences.

By addressing the basic structures of human existence, we can unsettle our received views and understandings about the nature of our humanity in our present condition, which is governed by capitalism, a form of the existential mode of having. This allows us to explore the allocation of meaning within the dialectic between the subjective and the objective. Our goal is to clarify these actual structures of human existence. This will lead to an understanding of all possibilities for being given that they are rooted in the actual structures of our existence.

We can identify four main ontological dimensions, including the spiritual, the natural-physical, the social, and the intra-personal (i.e. the self) as they are approached by the tension between aloneness and being with others. We always find ourselves alone in a world that includes others and we have choices about how we participate in it. The fact that we are always alone but always in the midst of others is a paradox, for these two poles of our existence are interdependent. They are separate but are also bound up with each other. We understand our individuality relative to our sociality; and we understand our participation with others in terms of our individuality. We live in tension between these two elements and are constantly subjected to the existential disruption that occurs when there is imbalance between them. This tension becomes an interpretive filter in our experience of these ontological dimensions.

The integration of this dialectical tension within and throughout these dimensions conditions the possibilities that are actualized in our thoughts, words, and actions. Most of this process, we shall see, is inauthentic, which means that the actualization of one’s range of possibility within one’s aloneness and one’s participation is avoided and thereby becomes limited. There is a closure to the presencing of our faculty of transcendence, which governs our range of possibilities, and therefore, our pursuit of deeper meaning.

In the case of being-alone, actualization is limited by ignorance and selfishness; in the case of being-with, by self-concern and disregard for others. These are our existential distortions. These inauthentic states result from too much emphasis on subjectivist modes of being and little regard for the natural, i.e., that which is Other, and that which moves us away from inflexible ego states, Thus, we can create inauthentic aloneness and inauthentic being with others that is contaminated with the subjective.

Foundationally, we are always alone, with a history that is our own, and with a solitude that reveals this aloneness. We see that we entered a world that we did not choose, and that we have features and attributes that are uniquely ours. This thrownness is our facticity, which is an unalterable state of affairs that operates as a set of conditions or boundaries from which we make free choices. Further, we alone know our aloneness and although we can use words to share it with others, there is always a gap between the words and the actual experience that is uniquely ours. Thus, there is both a discursive level and an existential level to our aloneness. It is a fundamental mode of being in the world. We are ontologically alone even though we can create practical-moral relations with Others.

There are a number of parallel modes of being that emerge from this aloneness as fundamental, including the distinction between actuality and possibility, our own death, responsibility for choice, the movement between anxiety and fear, and the moment of trust and hope. We cannot help but be future directed because of the very structure of our consciousness. As we interpret our facticity, we realize that we have a range of choices within which we constitute the meaning of our lives. These possibilities are limited by our facticity and the choices we make are radically free within our unique situations. Our lives, therefore, are always conditioned by the dialectic between actuality and possibility, as both obligation and privilege.

Although it is difficult if not impossible to predict the future trajectories of our lives, we do know that death is certain for every one of us. Moreover, it is not just an event that will happen in the future; instead, we live with that possibility in consciousness everyday of our lives. We recognize this as a limit to the regulatory function of transcendence. Further, the way we interpret that possibility conditions the way we operate in space and time, and in all other existential dimensions. It constitutes the very foundation of all our thinking, feeling, and behavior. As we reflect on this possibility, we also realize that we face death alone—in solitude, but in the midst of Others, and without the power to change this destiny.

We are also responsible for the choices that we make and are responsible therefore for our very existence. However, there is an ontological terror that comes with this responsibility and an equal terror in the consideration of our own deaths. We flee in a number of ways, into the particular entities of the world that capture our subjective interest. All too often, these are entities that humans have created, enclosing in cultural value and our subjective judgments about these values. Yet, our essential being resides in our ontological possibility in the face of death, not in the external world. If we pursue the external world, we focus on particular entities, manipulating and organizing them in a way that we hope assuages our anxiety. Our justification comes from doing what is normal or expected by others, being pulled away from our solitude through the ideologies that construct value. The cost is that we lose ourselves. We lose the presencing to our being as we acquire the world of others through having.

When we are inauthentically alone, we have chosen to allow ourselves to be absorbed into the particular entities of the world in some way – through the mode of having. In this mode we are blind to beings and Being. Here, we believe that these particular entities are self-sufficient, foundational to our existence, and the primary if not sole source of meaning in our lives. However, when we exist in this mode, choosing predictability and security by concentrating on particular entities, we lose connection to the whole of our being. Unfortunately, this focus does not dispel our anxiety and usually increases it in my experience. This brings us to a consideration of the distinction between anxiety and fear.

In existentialisms, it is commonly accepted that fear always has as its object a particular entity within the world and can be dispelled by avoiding that object. For example, I might be afraid of bears, so I avoid them when I can. In contrast, anxiety is not focused on any particular object but on our existence itself; further, we are always embedded in anxiety, faced with our thrownness, that we were born alone and will die alone, and that we have a range of potentials for being. In fact, we experience anxiety even more when we recognize the illusory security brought by attachment to particular entities. This anxiety comes when we realize that our whole life’s focus on the false security of particular entities has been an entire project of ignoring our being and ignoring the fact that we will die in the future.

Anxiety is comprised originally of the potential ontological insecurity that we all have by virtue of being alive. This is the existential terror that causes us to limit our radical freedom by strategies of absorption into a world of entities and through a kind of self-deception that facilitates this absorption. It is also true that humans realize that these absorptions and deceptions are futile and, as a result, become depressed, alienated, hopeless, and even desperate. This is the plight of those who are compulsively addicted to pursuing drugs, alcohol, things, ideas, people, and anything else that they think they can possess.

Unfortunately, there is always a letdown that occurs after every attempt to fill emptiness by absorption in these things. This letdown quickly moves into a deeper anxiety that can become chronic, along with a giving up and a belief that the world is dark and meaningless. On the other hand, we can use the anxiety as fuel to continue searching for meaning, purpose, and greater potential in ourselves. In short, we can welcome our anxiety as a signpost for discovery, creativity, and new awareness of our potentials for being.

In this new existential attitude, we fully accept our ontological condition in its entirety and thereby accept our radical aloneness and finitude. When we accept this, we accept the fact that we have both being and non-being. We are, materially, and we are conscious ideally, in an interplay of being and non-being that provides us possibility of transformation and change toward the future. In simple terms, we are, and we are not.

When we fully appreciate our beingness and our consciousness of this beingness—our existence—we can begin to ask the questions about the purpose and meaning of our lives. But this state of being is pre-conceptual, at the ontological level. This is the level in which we apprehend our existence as a whole—fully aware of an open phenomenological field that underlies and animates our facticity. We must realize that the conceptually reflected-upon question, even though it refers back to the ontological level, is not the same level of experience as the ontological level.

The articulation of the existential question is a conceptual reflection of a deeper concern. Yet, we must then realize that we cannot simply provide a conceptual answer to these existential questions, for they never satisfy us. There is a certain degree of hollowness to the conceptual articulation unless it is tied and connected to the existential-ontological. It is something of a paradox that we can never fully apprehend the existential through the conceptual-intellectual level though we cannot dispense with the existential.

This originary level is prior to the level of concepts and belief, and it involves the creation and development of an ontological bond between our facticity and our possibilities, reaching toward hope and fulfillment, and responsibility. This is the genesis of our worlding and our freedom. It is when this deeper level of existential concern is forgotten, and conceptual belief systems assume primary importance that we fall prey to the loss of real ontological security. Thus, we can see that it is the bond between the existential and the conceptual, the ego and the deeper self, that is most important and that we must discover and create new ways of
apprehending and presencing ourselves within it. Both inform and enrich each other.

In short, by re-invigorating this connection between the ontological and the conceptual – between our deeper self and our ego – we reinvest in our whole being and sometimes can re-structure it. This allows the totality of our undiscovered and non-created potentials to unfold. This is a process of moving toward authentic being, reintegrating our fragmented existential continuity. Let’s now address being with others.

It is easy to see that though we are sometimes alone – and always ontologically separate – we are always in a world with others. This is a basic existential because it is an ontological relation that is constitutive of the way we are in the world; it is a fundamental part of our anthropology. It is difficult to conceive of being without others. Thus, even though we have solitude and experience loneliness, and understand ourselves as individuals, we are never without the Other. We are always bound to each other in some way, through practical relations and also by our very existence. Our very existence implies the Other. We are, therefore, inter-relational in our very nature.

We can see evidence of our inter-relational being in our use of language, for example. While it is true that we formulate language and speech by ourselves as individuals, it is also true that those thoughts always exist within the context of a shared language, belief, and value system. Our speech is meaningful only because it occurs within this social context. It is not just the individual words or their utterance that gives them their ontological quality. Rather, it is the sharing of inner experience through language that creates a connection with (human) others.

This sharing is constitutive of the ontological properties of language. This ontological constitution of being with others is dialectical in a couple of ways. One way it is dialectical is that our being with others comes fully to life in speech acts with others; thus, these acts we share. A second way it is dialectical is that there is an intimate connection between the intellectual and the existential. Thus, developing the sophistication with which we articulate our ontological structures actually helps us deepen our connection to our existential dimension, helping us to bring reality to light. Developing our intellectual and language tools will aid us in maturing our being with human others. Further, developing our inter-species communication tools will lead to the evolution of our authentic and moral relations with members of other species.

It is easy to see how others are unavoidable in everything we think, feel, and do because we are relational beings. Furthermore, we can open to this fundamental constituent of our being or we can close ourselves off from it. We can have a greater or lesser concern for the plight of others. We have a choice about it. It is my belief that living in the mode of having causes humans to ignore this unity of being with others, and therefore moves us away from more authentic being.

This is the phenomenon of self-concern, which includes the derivatives such as selfishness, egotism, and narcissism, and its more extreme forms, greed, reckless disregard, and sadism toward the welfare of Others. By being overly concerned with the self, even in our sociality, we distort the possibility of being with the other in the fullest way. This is a type of alienation that limits more developed possibilities for each one of us and for our communities.

This involves the problem of presencing, i.e., how we show up in the lives of others and how we show up for ourselves. It is truly a magnificent phenomenon as well as a difficult task for all humans. When we de-presence ourselves to this existential dimension of being with others, we treat others not as whole persons—as subjects—but as objects – as “its” or things. When we treat others as objects, we create a different constellation of thoughts, feelings, and actions toward them than when we treat them as subjects.

When we do this, we do not see the Other in his or her reality; instead we see the other in terms of what I call the “possessive self.” This is the self that posits itself as the center of all reality, thereby losing all other perspective about the other. We simply do not see the other from his perspective, nor do we see the Other from a non-narcissistic viewpoint that is generated from our own interests and desires. In this mode of de-presencing, we only see the Other in terms of our own categories, formulating attributes and characteristics about him that come from our own anxiety and our own distorted resentments and not from their reality.

When we exist in this mode of having—in which we “have” our categories to experience the world—we lose connection to our deeper ontological roots, seeing only the exterior of the other (which is by definition, distorted), and not anything of their interior reality. There is, therefore, a completely different constellation of phenomena in an alienated dynamic than there is in a fully developed and presenced being-with-others. To the extent that one creates this alienated, possessory dynamic, he or she cripples chances for authentic being and relation, removed from intimacy, and fragmented in existential continuities, closed off and isolated. Some of these ontological attitudes include fear, seductiveness, avarice, jealousy, dishonesty, aversion, indifference, inconsideration, cruelty, and sadism.

There are more derivations from this ontological orientation to consider, but the basic ontological structure is alienation and a choice not to be with others – to reject the Other. Any dynamic that disparages the other, or that avoids concern for the other is a variation of this ontological distortion. This is far from realistic possibilities for a larger, broader, and deeper anthropology of the human, all of which require an ontological shift in ourselves. Moreover, these inauthentic attitudes always disrupt the continuity and flow of a fuller being in the world, creating fragmentations that always lead to disease and unhappiness.

When we overcome our inauthentic modes, we can actually approach and develop our authentic being with others. This always goes beyond self-concern to an ontological region in which we apprehend possibilities for ourselves and the Other simultaneously within that foundational space. That is, we discern the ground from which those possibilities emerge. This requires us to regard each other, including oneself, as significant; that we not allow repugnance just like we not allow attachment that comes from desire. I have written on this topic before, in my analysis of sado-masochistic psychological dynamics, which always involves dominating/dominated attachments to the Other (and derivatively to things, ideas, places, and the like), but it always involves the seeking of [false] ontological wholeness through these attachments.

Indifference, repugnance, and the use of another for ontological wholeness are all distortions of authentic being with others. These attitudes all result from the mode of having, and therefore, from viewing others as things. Of course, there are variations of these attitudes, yet they are all ontological projections of our need for wholeness: eventually we learn that wholeness cannot be experienced this way. One way to test this is after these projections have gained some level of satiety. For example, desire always runs its course, and often our aversion to others is balanced by later wistfulness at lost opportunities. Indifference demonstrates an absolute disregard for and lack of seeing the Other. It is such a powerful disregard that it is a phenomenology that can easily be understood by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

This kind of destabilization in our inauthentic relationships is based on our subjective projections about what we imagine them to be instead of who they are. In fact, our inauthentic attitudes say much about ourselves and nothing about the person we falsely imagine. In short, they become placeholders in our imaginary theatre. However, we can let go of this theatre with all its distortions, and therefore detach from these subjectivist, ego-driven ways of treating others.

In this new ontological experience, we view each other as the same—equal in value—and everyone has significance. The dialectic between repulsion and seduction is replaced with a calm, even equanimity that does not engage in projection. This involves compassion and empathy. As I have written about extensively in previous works, we can engage in rigorous examination of our values and of our social relations, one by one, to assess whether they are inauthentic or authentic.

By comparing our tendency toward inauthentic modes with this achievable reflective equanimity/compassion, we can begin to see a clear distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic. This is the method that brings us to reflective clarity, seeing each and all of us as equals. Once we do this, we can live through a practice of building authentic relationships. The important element here is that we must unbind ourselves from being overly attached to the subjective component of meaning. Instead of focusing solely on the subjective source of meaning, we can look beyond ourselves to an objective source of meaning. This is the meaning that resides in the ontological-existential structures that exist in all cases. This is the objective source of meaning that I believe must inform a new anthropology of what we consider to be the human.

By learning this practice—which is more than seeking insight and which requires regular action—we develop a much greater capacity for empathy. This is not only empathy for the other; it is empathy for our-selves. This presencing of empathy allows us a greater discernment of all those things that make us human and, in fact, allows us to open to a much greater perspective and vision of what we mean by the human. However, this empathy is grounded by the ontological insight that an essential part of our humanity is being-with others. This means all Others, both human and non-human.

Further, as I presence myself in my empathy, I come to realize that everything that is basically important to me—the avoidance of pain and fear, and the seeking of happiness and safety—is concomitantly true of all others universally. By opening ourselves to this truth we also open to our natural equality with others. At the same time that we lessen our self-importance, we start to see others as subjects and not as objects.

We recognize their participation in being just like our own, and this encourages us to deepen our awareness of the ontological presuppositions and dimensions for all humans, as I have outlined. This provides a motivation to practice this awareness and even more so, to actively avoid alienating and harming others and, instead, engaging in behavior that promotes their wellbeing and happiness. More radically, we may come to see that self-concern is not actually part of our essential ontology; that it is illusory.

It is crucial to my thesis that we understand the truth of our ontological foundation; similarly, it is important that we understand the connection of our ontological foundation to our lives as we lead them—with historical, social, familial structures in which our individual narratives proceed. To focus solely on conceptual thought without becoming aware of its roots in ontology inevitably focuses us toward subjective sources of meaning in our human experience. In contrast, when we see and acknowledge our true ontological roots, we become open to objective sources of meaning, which reside universally, outside of self-concern.

By incorporating this ontological awareness into our lives, we open up a set of possibilities in our experience that goes far beyond the constellation of possibilities we discover in inauthentic social relations that are based on self-concern. Moreover, our fulfillment can only come from actualizing a life that emerges from an awareness of our ontological essential ontological structures. Self-concern closes our authentic possibilities; regard for each, all, and ourselves opens them. What is more, we move from passivity to proactivity that deepens and enlarges our concern for all of us equally. This concern enlarges and deepens because we are able to apprehend greater sources of objective meaning, understanding how we form subjective sources of meaning and how they can become distortive if they are not well grounded in the knowledge of our ontological structures.

This changes our motivations and action potentials, readying us for new concrete life practice – a praxis. This new practice involves, therefore, an awareness of our ontological structures; a constant practice of renewing this awareness; and putting this awareness into practice as we modify our behavior. This requires that we constantly engage in a dialectical process between an orientation based on self-concern and an orientation based on a new ontological awareness. By engaging in this dialectic within ourselves, we come to realize that our interests are equal, and not only equal, but the same.

This gives us new perspective to challenge the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that come from self-concern and a distorted understanding of the sources of meaning for humanity. Most importantly, this new attitude comes about not only from analysis and/or apprehension of cultural values; it also comes from a presencing to our essential ontological structures.

Thus, meaning comes from our being and how we live our lives. It does not come from acquisitions within a mode of having. As I have shown earlier, when we allow ourselves to be absorbed into a world of things, ideas, places, and people that we can possess, we live in illusory meanings. What is worse is that when we live in a possessory, having mode, we assume that others do as well. This creates assumptions about relationships that interpret the “Good” instrumentally, in which we see others in practical ways that are based on their use to us. In this paradigm there is no intrinsic value to human beings. In this lifeworld, moral structures emerge from the mode of having and not the mode of being.

My motivations toward others are thus based on facilitating the acquisitions of others, thereby promoting their absorption into a world of things, ideas, people, places, and the like. This creates a world that primarily values experience in terms of possession and acquisition, and the exchanges thereof. However, as I have shown, a society that operates primarily in the mode of having loses connection with the deep ontological roots that provide us with the sources of meaning, and thereby create a broader and deeper set of possibilities.

Further, these possibilities that are based on our human ontological roots contain more of what is truly human than do relational dynamics that focus on accumulation, acquisition, and having. Without actualizing our social and individual possibilities that are based on the truth of our being, we diminish our chances for our wellbeing. Instead, we must realize that our welfare and the welfare of others is interdependent, and that it is solely based on being and not having. This is our authentic nature.

There is much more to develop than this preliminary sketch. There is the spiritual dimension, the natural-physical, along with the self in its apprehension of being alone, and the social in the mode of being with others. There is temporality and death, uncertainty, and structures that we did not create. There is the dialectic between the emotional and the intellectual, the mystical and the discursive. I will leave the development of these dimensions and ideas for a later work. Nevertheless, the dialectic between being alone and being with others is obviously a deep ontological truth about our humanity. Our struggle is to figure out how to be alone with others in ways that are authentic and to avoid the ways that are inauthentic. That which is inauthentic lives in the mode of having, thereby drawing the sources of meaning almost solely from the subjective.

Finally, the inauthentic mode limits our possibilities for growth and development and also restricts our responsibility and closes the range of our experience. This usually results in a nearly exclusive life that resides in being alone, absorbed in entities, but not in the relations with others. Self-concern is paramount. In contrast, we can turn away from acquisitiveness, understand that we begin and end alone, but that through the life journey we are fundamentally related to others at an ontological level. This is the beginning of an understanding of solidarity, where we acknowledge that we participate as individuals, but that our aggregations are more than practical; they are ontological. Furthermore, solidarity can be interpreted in a number of ways and thereby lead to a number of groups of like-minded individuals who recognize that all groups are common ontologically.

Opening to this new existential orientation allows us to focus individually on our development in being without compromising our solidarity and our responsibilities. This self-development, if it focuses on a greater awareness and responsivity to the Other, leads to a greater participation in our ontological connection, both individually and socially. We can thus deepen our ontological awareness through community with others.

By participating with others, we are awakened in our aloneness to reflect on a more authentic orientation toward ourselves and all others. This motivates a greater care and concern for others, to facilitate their participation in being. Both modes of being inform and interpenetrate each other thereby developing an integrated life that is more consonant with our ontological foundation.

We restrict our possibilities if we denigrate or ignore either side. Likewise, we disable our fullest anthropology to the extent we ignore Being—to the extent that we ignore objective sources of meaning that reside in being and not in our subjectivity. This requires us to detach from our self-concern and to actively promote the interest of others, which is always located in the ontological foundations of the being of our humanity. This operates as a new Archimedean point, allows us to think against ourselves, and to create ontological distance from the master signifier – a semiology of capitalism that is a variation of the mode of having. This is a question of responsibility.

Kevin Boileau, 2019

Writing in Montana & California

Trans-Humanist Anthropology
There are many species of beings that we humans will never see, and many that are in our daily ecosystems that we choose not to see. Yet, they are there—here—rather, constantly watching, looking, appealing—usually to we humans. We don’t see them because of our own systems of value that are informed by our narcissism: our egocentrism. This type of consciousness therefore closes itself in on itself, not seeing other life, other humans, and our very selves. This is the possessory, dominating subjectivity that instrumentalizes all others, and even in a system indoctrinated by rights and duties, fails to see the Other’s world on its own terms, as its unique manifestation. Both Levinas and Burggraeve see this, understanding all too well that the anthropology based on autonomy constantly struggles within the consciousness of a desiring, egocentric self. This is what leads to their formulations and developments of heteronomy (not a Kantian heteronomy but an existential, trans-human type that I describe earlier). I take this further, but I don’t think I see that far and I don’t know where this will lead. Perhaps it is in part a regulatory principle and, in part, a specifiable grounding. I am not sure. Let us proceed.

First, we must dismiss the notion that humans are better, of more worth, or higher on a value scale. We must substitute it with a new axiom of ontological parity. This is for the reasons I mention earlier.

Second, we must agree that in principle that most of us have little knowledge about the whole: about how all beings, processes, and structures work together in an ecosystem. We substitute it with a new axiom of rigorous inquiry.

Third, we must accept a new Archimedean point. We cannot pretend to be at the center of the universe or the planet earth. This means that we must render an accounting of all life forms, including ours, holding that all living beings have equal interests and rights. We must, therefore, have an axiom that recognizes we play a part in the whole but are not the whole, and that we must mediate and weigh our interests relative to those of other life forms.

Fourth, we must recognize that all life forms come from the same source. This leads us to the reconstituted notion of solidarity. This is a trans-human notion that includes the human equally with all other life forms.

Fifth, we must acknowledge and accept a new depth and breadth of our responsibility to others, including humans, other sentient life forms, additional life forms, and the environment in general.

Sixth, we must work diligently to formulate and articulate a new philosophical anthropology for human beings. This means we must strive for new meaning and understanding of the world and our place within it. This is neither the autonomous subject nor the heteronomous subject but it is a new human. This re-formulates the reality principle.

Let us discuss these axioms together. Presently, our collective view focuses on human desire in which there is an implied and sometimes stated thesis that the world revolves around the interest of humans. In this view, other life forms have lesser value; we wouldn’t want to argue that they have no value but to say “lesser” still gives us the same power to torture and destroy them, these other life forms. It actually goes even further than this: humans are so caught up in their desires, which creates a certain form of the way we see and perceive, that they most often just ignore the interests of other life forms. Because they ignore other life they don’t even come to the table enough to reflect on their interests. This is an unreflective life project with unreflective opinions. By definition an unreflective opinion is uncritical: it lacks thought. My intent is to interrogate this uncritical state in such a way that we deepen our understanding of it.

If the reader looks at these six axioms as a whole she can see that there is an isomorphism between individual narcissism (disregarding the Other human) and cultural/species narcissism (disregarding other life forms). Both include the same preoccupation with self or culture, and both ignore or actively trounce on the interests of Others. Moreover, we can see that there is an over-reliance on the law, which I explained earlier in this book. An over-reliance on the law is a retreat to the familiarity of the superego position, i.e., the dominant proscriptions of one’s society and culture. This is a denial of the transcendent in both the individual and in the social elements of a culture. There is also a compulsion to rely on the words used to taxonomically differentiate one type of being from another, which includes different levels of ontological value, rights, and protections. For example, in many jurisdictions wild animals are considered property, and become personal property once they are taken from the forest. This allows the human taker to do anything he wants to the “property.” Analogously [and curiously], there are historical examples amongst humans, in cases of race and gender, in which different categories of humans were assigned different value. It is the same kind of thinking. Although this is a change in name, it is not necessarily a change in action although this might be the first step in a long-term, developmental process of change.

It may be the case that we are limited in new thought because the very language we use to think about and talk about these issues is already value-laden and therefore pre-figures the range of thinking we can engage in about it. For example, if we say that a breeding dog is a cash crop—a piece of property—and property cannot have rights, then a breeding dog does not have rights. In contrast, if we say that a breeding dog is a sentient being and that all sentient beings have rights, we must conclude that breeding dogs have rights. In these two cases, it is the language that foreshadows and determines the moral conclusions. Perhaps this is what explains why animals have not been included in various bills of rights. I venture the thought that if we reconsider the taxonomy and more so the language itself, we might come to new conclusions. This is not to say that behavior change would be easily forthcoming. We have many years of structural habits now embedded in the law, our minds, our moral thinking, and values. Making this radical shift will not be easy but changing language and therefore meaning, could have a profound effect on the way humans construct meaning and on the way they are predisposed to behave.

Another common theme at the foundation of these axioms is, either explicitly or implicitly, the requirement that we a) put huge demands on our quest for scientific knowledge so to understand the way ecosystems flourish and b) to engage in more rigorous hermeneutic inquiry of the meaning of these axioms and their competitors. In short, I propose a strong sense of the meaning of responsibility as I outlined earlier in this work. This implies a derivative duty to gain more accurate, deeper, broader, and truer perspective about the meaning of the human anthropology, and the way we fit in ecosystems in good ways. It might be argued that we already do that, but I am suggesting even greater critical awareness. I suggest this explicitly with those words, and I suggest it implicitly by arguing that through a phenomenological inquiry we can discover what is most human in humans [which implies an account of trans-humanist understanding of the whole]. I don’t think we are there yet.

I want to take up a different line of thought that may help us understand and reconsider why we assign humans a higher ontological value than other life forms. It is a phenomenological thought. In the contemporary world we have become aware that our sense of sight dominates other senses. This means that the sort of beliefs and values about the world come from this domination and subjugation. I hypothesize that there is correlation between this domination and the co-phenomena of individual and cultural narcissism, i.e., a debased Archimedean point. The things we desire we see, and we see the things we desire. That is, we reinforce a connection between what we learn to desire and how we see the world. Unfortunately, this prioritization of the ocular/specular de-prioritizes our other senses such as hearing. We become so sense dominated by vision that we do not notice our other senses as much. This hides and subjugates value.

In order to consider this idea we might engage in a reflective, phenomenological analysis of our everyday sensory experience. Of course, we bring with us proprioception. We also smell, touch, and taste, and these pathways are powerful guides in our hodological choices. Hearing seems a bit different intuitively, for we rely on it for our very survival, I think, more often that these other senses. Yet, our sensory experience of seeing is altogether in a different category. Although we would have a diluted existence without the first three senses, without hearing we compromise our safety (and this is not to say that we don’t use the three senses for our safety and survival). Without our vision, more so: our lives are in danger constantly. However, there is something more going on with sight—remember the adage seeing is believing—because we often connect our sense of truth and knowledge with our ability to see and what we see. One can easily understand how this is also connected with our very survival; however, it is also connected with our sense of value. What I mean is that our vision lies at the bottom of those things we value. Because we desire those things we value, one can make a rudimentary argument that what we see controls our desire, supplemented by parallel processes with other senses.

It is my belief, and I know this needs to be worked out further, that there is a close connection between our dominant human anthropology—the humanism of autonomy—and the priority of vision, i.e. the ocular. We might even call it the “specular,” because of our lack of engaged participation that arises from becoming spectators. Of course, there is the distinction between need and want, and we all desire the things we need. However, it is my belief that the motivational process is different from those things we are taught to desire through culture, media, society, and other people. In short, there is a different motivational network, which is largely reinforced by sight. These constructed “needs” carry with them a distortion of value and a distortion of sensation. The conclusion I am driving at here is that we overly rely on our vision to lead us to goods and experiences of value. Let’s tie these ideas in with the equalization rule in phenomenology itself, as follows.

The equalization rule (or rule of horizontalization) requires us to catalog the contents of our consciousness while giving the same value to each element of our experience, in all dimensions. At the same time we bracket our regular, everyday experience, which includes our valuations. This allows us to compare the neutral view with our normal and regular view, which leads to more reflective inquiry and understanding. If we apply this type of thinking to sensory experience we can immediately see three things: One, how we so clearly allow vision to outrank other senses; two, how this distortion leads to further distortions on valuation; and three how we are inexorably led to construct the autonomous, egocentric, narcissistic self I have outlined. In short, this over-reliance on our vision has far-reaching effects in our ability to critically reflect on our attitudes, choices, and behaviors. In our current schema, this leads to our tendency to construct a certain kind of self; this is the kind of self that does not see the whole; this is the kind of self that overlooks the obvious facts and values that present. By considering the axiom of ontological parity and the descriptive phenomenological rule of equalization we can re-align the way we utilize our sense experience. This can help us not be so tied to the ocular and therefore not so tied to autonomy as our foundational interpretation of humanity. There is much more thinking that must be done on this issue, but I leave it for now and take up the topic of anxiety, relative to the main interpretations of what it means to be human.

Before we move on this text, I’d like to consider another piece of the humanist puzzle, which turns on the issue of anxiety. Humans do many things with their anxiety, both on an individual level and on a cultural level. We understand both of these dimensions through complex discourses like psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and critical theory, which can give us valuable clues to the meaning possibilities of our humanity. I like to think of anxiety as the human experience that emerges from our (future-oriented) ontological field. It is the apprehension of our possibilities in conditions of uncertainty, which emanates in our mind and ripples through our embodiment. Because of the ontological unsettledness and sometimes terror that comes to awareness from these fields of possibility, we are driven to reduce and ameliorate it. These attempts always originate in the mind and involve distortions in thinking, that is, false beliefs that reduce anxiety. At least this is the goal, even though it is not always successful. Nevertheless, I think there is something going on at a deeper level. This is the level of the construction of the self, which I have been exploring and discussing throughout this book. It is my contention that there are cultural and social factors, along with intra-psychic, indigenous personal factors that structuralize our anxiety. In short, we think, feel, and do things with our anxiety, both as individuals and as societies. It is how we structure our being.

If what I am suggesting has merit, then we can think of philosophical anthropology—the constitution and structuralizing of our humanity—as phenomenal forms of our anxiety. In this view, therefore, the humanisms of autonomy, heteronomy, and vivantonomy are different archetypal structures of anxiety, formed by many complex, intricately related factors. I think it is safe to say that we can analyze the structures of anxiety, both individually and culturally in a number of ways. For example, we can look at health, functionality, consequences, existential expression, and many more aspects. In terms of the three main structures I have been examining, we can make value judgments about their effects, as I have been outlining. Levinas himself argues that Eros is as strong as death. It is not fusion, struggle, or knowledge but is an insurmountable duality. It is a relationship with what always slips away as a mystery. It never becomes us or ours but its alterity is preserved in the relation. For Levinas, sociality is thus founded on a dyadic relationship, transformed from a theological to a secular ethics. This relational alterity, which is dyadic in character, became the bedrock of Levinas’s later, more mature ethical thought. What is more, it is phenomenological in method, as we will continue to see, as we explore his developed account of ethics.

I think this notion of Levinas’s is most important—his calling attention to the idea of Eros. It is my belief that Eros is the antidote to anxiety and to resentment, the kinds that come from anxiety. More strongly, as I have argued in the past, most humans have a false relationship with their consciousness. They reject transcendence and the possibility of change, not because it is to difficult [that is the red herring], but because it opens an ontological field that creates terror. Thus, instead of choosing an orientation in being that is trans-humanist we opt for the kind of alienating and possessive structures of autonomy that lead to either sado-masochistic human dynamics, or annihilating behaviors toward Others (humans, animals, self). Thus, how we transform our anxiety into courageous acts of self-development becomes paramount. This exploration is worthy of a whole book, which I will leave for another time. However, I’d like to make a few additional comments, in terms of various discourses that attempt to understand conflict, which I find quite helpful. People often think about conflict and difference as a dilemma. In this either-or fantasy, people believe that either they gain the object of their desire or they don’t, which puts us into direct competition with others.

Now that I have laid out some preliminary axioms, though I do not think my list is exhaustive, being more of a starting point, I would like to continue to explore some ideas about what this trans-humanist perspective is. Formerly, I used the term pantheonomy with great hesitation. I temporarily replace it with the term vivantonomy, which suggests a foundation that is concerned with life, not myself (as autonomy) and not myself only in relation to other human beings (as heteronomy). This would require that we overcome the desirous, narcissistic, egocentric consciousness that primarily valorizes autonomy. This would require us to shift the source of meaning from the subject to the object but not in the scientized way of the Enlightenment. The clues to engage this are already extant in Levinas and Burggraeve. It requires us, as I have stated here in this text and in my Essays on Phenomenology and the Self to shift the source of meaning away from our current forms of subjectivity to a) a new construction and interpretation of objectivity and then to b) a dimension beyond objectivity (as the polarized opposite of subjectivity. This is so because I take it that humans are primarily meaning-seeking agents. We have consciousness so we are self-aware. We have moral consciousness in that we evaluate our behavior. We are driven to understand the world and who we are. This is all meaning-seeking behavior. Unfortunately, the primary ways that we have sought meaning in the modern world result in two cultural modes, as I shall explain.

One of the ways we seek meaning is through our own subjectivity: we look at our own experience, albeit narcissistic and ego-centered, and construct a sense of meaning. As we have shown, this type of meaning supports power relations, desire, possession, and violence, requiring that we enter into cooperative pacts and alliances to stave off these drives—usually toward ownership and accumulation. Even in those more benign forms of subjectivity, the ones that are not abusive, we end up neglecting others simply because we don’t regard them. We don’t regard them because don’t see or hear them. In this state we become so embedded inside ourselves that we lose attention on others and don’t even see the rest. This source of meaning is wanting, therefore, because it doesn’t found a social or political community based in solidarity, rights, and responsibility. In contrast, seeking meaning through scientific naturalism and universal claims to truth, i.e., that which comprises much of modern science, errs in the opposite direction but in a way that is tied to an over-reliance on the subject. In this mode, we find meaning in a type of objectivism that also comes from the same narcissistic, egocentric type of self that lands in subjectivism. This is the kind of thinking that takes a teleological and instrumental view of other people, all sentient beings, other things, and the environment in general. To be sure, modern science is useful and powerful, and great things have come from it. However, we are subtly and not so subtly paying a price for it that comes from its destructive effects. This type of objectivism does not discover things as they are in themselves. Instead, it discovers things-as-they-can-be-useful. These are two different things, the latter based on a lack of ontological parity.

Nevertheless, we are not merely meaning-seeking beings. Our will moves us in a number of ways, for example, toward power, the construction of a self, the need to be recognized, and more. Thus, we can say that humans have a will toward a number of dimensions. I believe that these alternative articulations can also be used to develop an account parallel to that of meaning, in which we understand that their goal and their method constitutes a distorted subjectivity or in the reverse is constituted by a distorted subjectivity. This is a joint problem of the wrong noematic focus and the wrong noesis.

If we use Professor Brentano’s important axiom that human consciousness always has intentional structures toward the world, along with the joint concepts of noesis and noema, we gain some clarity about what I am proposing. (See his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint or his Descriptive Psychology.) The basic idea is that we always have intentionality in consciousness, even in the sorts of mediation practices that try to empty the mind of its contents. In those cases, we intend to empty the mind. In all other cases, too, we apprehend the world in terms of a subject-object polarity. Noema is the object toward which we are directed, which could be an external physical object like a tree or a dog. Noesis is the way we direct ourselves toward objects. For example, we can see an object as something to use instrumentally for our own purposes; in the alternative, we can see an object as something of beauty and value, as something to respect and protect. Of course, there are more ways of seeing, but these two demonstrate the tension that happens often between a purely humanist conception and a trans-humanist conception. In humanism, there is usually a lack of regard for animals and the environment except by accident. This is intrinsic to this type of noesis. In contrast, in a trans-humanist orientation in being, intentionality regards animals and the environment with the same value as humans. You can see two different types of noesis here, and this where we must focus. Professor Burggraeve shows us the difference between the egocentric, desirous type of intentionality and the non-egocentric, responsible sort of intentionality. These are two different noetic structures with highly different ways of approaching the world, and with different ways of seeing the same objects. We could go even further and propose that these different types of noetic structures actually see two different types of object.

We need a different type of basic noetic in the constitution of our human beingness. In this different noetic structure in consciousness, I propose that a couple of changes occur. For all these changes, we must turn away from focusing on our own desirous subjectivity, and refocus on the Other, Others, the objective world, but in a new way—with a different noetic. The first change in this refocus is to reflectively outline this different noetic in a way that proposes new values for animals and the environment. As I have been saying this is the axiom of ontological parity. This process would be a hermeneutic exercise in which we substitute in the new value, see the object in a new way, reinterpret our sense of the value, then refine our noetic clarity. This is a back and forth process that qualitatively shifts our noetic structure and method. When we compare this type of “objectivity” with the type we are criticizing, we notice profound differences. No longer are we searching for universal structures that we attempt to control and manipulate. Instead, we are searching for the object world as it is in itself free from our egocentric need for control. This requires the shift in value I mentioned, a shift in intentionality, and ultimately a shift in our human anthropology: we actually become different human beings. Our orientation in being transmutes; our behavioral choices vary. Our very consciousness becomes different.

The second change in this refocus is much more radical but inclusive of the first change. While it requires a different noetic structure, as I state, this radical change also requires us to reconsider the very way we construct the subject-object polarity. Imagine that it was not always the case that we saw the world in terms of such a rigid subject-object polarity, and moreover, that we didn’t see the world in such a radically instrumental sort of a way. We can imagine all sorts of different variations of this. This is a part of the reconstruction of how we see the object world, as I state, but it is more. It requires us to unsettle the way we pare out the dichotomy between the subject and the object, and perhaps re-envision what we think of as subject and what we think of as object. It is clear to me that they—the subject and the object—co-constitute each other. They are constructions that come from culture, society, and from our own personal history. Thus, we can reflect on this ontological space which gives rise to the very subject-object distinction in the first instant. This is the space of life itself that acts as new, more original, more accurate foundation for rights, solidarity, responsibility, and the constitution of the self: one that takes into account the whole and not just the [human] dimension.

Thus, we transform human-centered anthropologies into trans-human ontologies that move us from egocentric, desirous, possessive, unmindful beings into a complex constellation of elements that constitute a new kind of humanity based on a new sort of autonomy that is grounded in vivantonomy. These new self-constitutions include the self-as-responsible, the self-that-lives-in-solidarity, the self-who-promotes-rights-of-all-that-lives, and the self-who-lives-in-underlying-ontological-space. We could formulate these elements with more finesse, I am sure, but leaving them in their rough state articulates them with crispness and accuracy. The second moment of this transformation comes from the replacements of egocentric values and action potentials with a whole new set of values and action potentials that are virtuous within this new worldview. The values and virtues come from a new anthropology that we become more identified with through the practices that constitute them. This trans-humanist foundation re-constitutes, therefore, what we mean by autonomy and heteronomy. In the last short sections in this book, I will make some additional comments about the relation of virtue to both freedom and responsibility. I will also consider some preliminary questions and inquiry into the contrast between a phenomenology of reverence and a phenomenology of violence and murder. The reason I include these last sections is to provide some additional ideas about the development of this new anthropology. They are also an early inquiry into a book I shall write about reverence and violence from a phenomenological point of view.

Existential Psychoanalytic
Institute & Society
2019-2020
Seminar
Curriculum

1ST DRAFT 1.1.19
*There may be small modifications in the reading depending upon
the needs of the EPIS community.
*Default is Mountain Time. Please adjust your
calendar depending upon your time zone.
Session 1:
September 6 & September 7 (2019)

Applied & Clinical Phenomenology/Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis:
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)

Bion
The Clinical Thinking of Wilfried Bion, Symington, Routledge, 1996.

1 – The theoretical disjunction between Bion and Freud/Klein p. 1
2 – Bion: His character p. 14
3 – The Emotional Catalyst p. 27
4 – The Grid p. 31

Note: We will engage in a reading of the text from a theoretical and clinical perspective, but also consider phenomenology and critical theory as part of
methodology.
Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology:
(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)

Patocka
Body, Community, Language, World. Jan Patocka. Translated by Erazim Kohak. Edited by James Dodd. Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999.

Part One – Body and the Personal Structure of Experience p. 1
First Lecture – Subject Body and Ancient Philosophy p. 3
Second Lecture – Body and Person – Descartes p. 9
Third Lecture – Body and Person – Modern Philosophy p. 19
Fourth Lecture – Personal Space: Reflection, Horizon p. 29
Fifth Lecture – Life’s Dynamics: Intentionality p. 39

Recommended (Primary)
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History. Jan Patocka. Translated by Erazim Kohák. Edited by James Dodd. Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1996.
Recommended (Secondary)
Edward F. Findlay, Caring for the soul in a postmodern age: politics and phenomenology in the thought of Jan Patočka

Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death

Erazim Kohak, Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected Writings
Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10-noon p.m., MT)

Lacan
Ecrits, The First Complete Edition in English, Lacan, Article 24 (“The Signification of the Phallus”) Note: This is a review from last year, but because it is such an important concept, we are looking at it again.

I may have a good summary article on this.
Critical Theory, Cultural Criticism & Psychoanalysis:
(Saturday, noon-2 p.m. MT)

Malabou
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience, Johnston, Malabou Columbia, 2013

Part I. Go Wonder: Subjectivity and Affects in Neurobiological Times p. 1

Introduction: From the Passionate Soul to The Emotional Brain p. 3

What Does “Of” Mean in Descartes’s Expression, “The Passions of The Soul?” p. 12
Session 2:
December 6 & December 7 (2019)

Applied & Clinical Phenomenology/Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis:
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Bion
The Clinical Thinking of Wilfried Bion, Symington, Routledge, 1996.

4 – The Grid – Review
5 – Myth and the Grid
6 – Container-Contained
7 – Alpha Function

Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology:
(Friday, 6-8 MT)

Patocka
Body, Community, Language, World. Jan Patocka. Translated by Erazim Kohak. Edited by James Dodd. Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999.

Part One – Body and the Personal Structure of Experience p. 1
Sixth Lecture – Recapitulation. Personal Situational Structures p. 47
Seventh Lecture – Recapitulation. Personal Situational Structures p. 55
Eighth Lecture – I and the Other: Appresentation and Being-With p. 83
Ninth Lecture – Being-in-The-Body and Phenomenology p. 69
Tenth Lecture – Three Types of Phenomenology p. 77

Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10-noon p.m. MT)
Lacan
Ecrits, Lacan, Article 25 (“In Memory of Earnest Jones: On His Theory of Symbolism”); Article 26 (“On an Ex Post Facto Syllabary”)
Critical Theory, Cultural Criticism & Psychoanalysis:
(Saturday, noon-2 p.m. MT)

Malabou
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience, Johnston, Malabou Columbia, 2013

A “Self-Touching You”: Derrida and Descartes p. 19

The Neural Self” Damasio Meets Descartes p. 26
Session 3:
March 6 & 7 (2020)

Applied & Clinical Phenomenology/Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis:
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Bion
The Clinical Thinking of Wilfried Bion, Symington, Routledge, 1996.

8 – A Diagnosis of Thought
9 – Psychic Reality
10 – The Growth of Thought
11 – Transformations
Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology:
(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Patocka
Body, Community, Language, World. Jan Patocka. Translated by Erazim Kohak. Edited by James Dodd. Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999.

Part Two – Being in the World: Two Phenomenologies
Eleventh Lecture – Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenology p. 89
Twelfth Lecture – Existence, Phenomenon p. 99
Thirteenth Lecture – Reflections as the Practice of Self-Discovery p. 109
Fourteenth Lecture – Phenomenology Within the Limits of Experience p. 119
Fifteenth Lecture – World of Objects and Pragmata
Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10-noon p.m. MT)

Lacan
Ecrits, Article 27 (“Guiding Remarks for a Convention on Female Sexuality”)

Critical Theory, Cultural Criticism & Psychoanalysis:
(Saturday, noon-2 p.m. MT)
Malabou
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience, Johnston, Malabou Columbia, 2013

Affects Are Always Affects Of Essence: Book 3 of Spinoza’s Ethics p. 35

The Face And The Close-up: Deleuze’s Spinozist Approach to Descartes p. 43

Session 4:
June 5 and June 6 (2020)

Applied and Clinical Phenomenology/Psychoanalytic-Existential Analysis:
(Friday, 4-6 p.m. MT)
Bion
The Clinical Thinking of Wilfried Bion, Symington, Routledge, 1996.

12 – The Study of Groups
13 – The Phenomenology of Psychosis
14 – Without Memory or Desire
15 – Ultimate Reality, Mystic and the Establishment
Epilogue
Transcendental/Existential Phenomenology:
(Friday, 6-8 p.m. MT)
Patocka
Body, Community, Language, World. Jan Patocka. Translated by Erazim Kohak. Edited by James Dodd. Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999.

Part Two – Being in the World: Two Phenomenologies
Sixteenth Lecture – Affection and Sensibility
Seventeenth Lecture – Care and the Three Movements of Human Life
Eighteenth Lecture –Care and the Three Movements of Human Life
Nineteenth Lecture –Phenomenality, Being, and the Reduction
Twentieth Lecture – Personal Spatiality, Heidegger
Psychoanalysis & Philosophy:
(Saturday, 10-noon p.m.)
Lacan
Ecrits, Lacan Article 28 (“The Youth of Gide, or the Letter and Desire”)
Critical Theory, Cultural Criticism & Psychoanalysis:
(Saturday, noon-2 p.m. MT)

Malabou
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience, Johnston, Malabou, Columbia, 2013

Damasio As A Reader Of Spinoza p. 50

On Neural Plasticity, Trauma, And The Loss of Affects p. 56

Conclusion p. 63
January 1, 2019 version
EPIS curriculum, copyright, 2019-20
Official Version, Draft 1
EPIS Education
Copyright EPIS Education 2019-20